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Abstract 
Using social network analysis, this paper studies the structure of trade 
networks that developed across West African borders. The first part 
aims to understand the centralization of cross-border trade networks. 
In a business environment where transaction costs are extremely high, 
we find that decentralized networks are well adapted to the various 
uncertainties induced by long-distance trade. We also study the trade-
offs faced by traders between embeddedness and brokerage and find 
that long-distance trade relies both on the trust and cooperation shared 
among local traders, and on the distant ties developed with foreign 
partners from a different origin, religion or culture. In the second part, 
we study the spatial structure of trade networks and the influence of 
national borders on the development of social ties. The paper shows 
that the spatial form of trade networks is constrained by the historical 
origin of the traders engaged in cross-border activities. In those 
markets where trade is recent and where most of the traders are not 
native of the region, national borders are likely to exert a greater 
influence than in those regions where trade has pre-colonial roots. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Chief Ibrahim Hassan looked out at the new developments being built around his compound 
and talked about the days when the city of Gaya was little more than a village along the Niger 
River. “There were no houses or warehouses around here”, he said, pointing at a 
businessman dressed in a long white robe supervising the loading of a Nigerian truck. “I have 
waited for seven years until the traditional authorities of old Gaya appointed me as District 
Chief. Nobody lived here on theses wild hillsides”. That was thirty years ago. A little more 
than 8,000 people lived in this Nigerien border town facing Benin and Nigeria, most of them 
from agriculture and fishing. They are now more than 45,000. Every day, hundreds of trucks 
loaded with food stuff, manufactured products, oil, and uranium concentrates, find their way 
along the crowded one-lane road that crosses Gaya, en route to the ports of the Gulf of Guinea 
or to the major cities of the Sahel. The Cotonou corridor, where Gaya is located, accounts for 
about half of the imported goods from Niger and three quarters of total Nigerien exports in 
terms of value. In the course of three decades, dozens of warehouses have been built by 
wholesalers attracted by the strategic location of the city, at the crossroad between three 
states. The city now stretches out over a length of four kilometres and the urban area – 
originally concentrated around old Gaya – has been extended more than ten times. 
The spectacular economic development of Gaya – among many other border cities in 
West Africa – would certainly not have been possible without the existence of national 
borders. Without the price differences across countries and the bans affecting the imports or 
exports of certain agricultural or manufactured products, West African traders would have 
fewer incentives to move their goods across the continent and avoid the taxes collected by 
customs authorities. Considering that the cost of moving goods in Africa is the highest in the 
world (Teravaninthorn and Raballand, 2009), second-hand clothes, for example, would 
probably not be imported through Benin, and then stored in a warehouse in Gaya, before 
being re-exported illegally to Nigeria where they are subject to an import ban – a journey of 
about 1,800 kilometres across three countries (Brooks and Simon, 2012). However, the 
existence of national borders is not a sufficient condition for trade to flourish. Not all border 
cities are important market places. Some of them lack market and road infrastructure or are 
predominantly dominated by administrative or political rather than business activities. Many 
border cities also lack one of the most important ingredients of trade: entrepreneurs willing to 
develop transnational networks. 
The interactions between opportunistic entrepreneurial strategies and strategic border 
locations remains poorly understood, despite their importance for local economic 
development and regional integration in West Africa. Using social network analysis, the 
objective of this paper is to begin to fill this gap by analysing the structure of cross-border 
trade networks in two border regions between Niger, Nigeria and Benin. 
The first part of the paper aims to understand the centralization of cross-border trade 
networks, which is crucial for their efficiency. We wish to know whether traders are 
organized in a hierarchical structure in which a few central actors transmit information, orders 
and resources, or in a rather decentralized way, in which every actor is connected to everyone 
else. In a business environment where transaction costs are extremely high, we find that 
decentralized networks are well adapted to the various uncertainties induced by long-distance 
trade. We also study the trade-offs faced by traders between embeddedness and brokerage for 
the purpose of determining whether traders are strongly embedded within their group of peers 
or if they play the role of brokers beyond their own business community. The paper finds that 
trade relies both on the trust and cooperation shared among local traders, and on the distant 
ties developed with foreign partners, potentially from a different origin, religion or culture.  
The second part of the paper considers the spatial structure of trade networks. We are 
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particularly interested in analysing the influence of national borders on the development of 
social ties. We study whether traders are organized with a multiplicity of cross-border ties, or 
according to several nationally-organized markets, with only a few brokers able to bridge the 
markets. The paper shows that the spatial form of trade networks is constrained by the 
historical origin of the traders engaged in cross-border activities. In those markets where trade 
has followed the recent liberalisation of commerce and where most of the traders are from 
outside the region, national borders are likely to exert a greater influence than in those regions 
where trade has developed since pre-colonial roots without major disruption. 
 
RELATED LITERATURE 
 
Trade and diasporas 
 
Scholars have long debated whether the structure of trade networks in West Africa was 
mainly reliant on innate factors such as birth, kin, and ethnicity, or on acquired factors such as 
merit, skilful bargaining and a mastery of commercial codes. Empirical evidence from pre-
colonial and colonial times supports both views. In some cases, traders recruited their sons, 
not their clients, into their businesses as junior partners, with birth providing legitimacy and 
allowing the creation of a group of obligors bound by family links and alliances. For example, 
family ties were particularly important in long-distance kola trade between Asante and Hausa 
and for Kooroko merchants during pre-colonial times (Amselle, 1977; Lovejoy, 1980). In 
other cases, the transmission of business knowledge between fathers and sons was been 
rendered impossible by historical disruptions, such as the brutal decline of trade cities or the 
establishment of national borders and railway roads (Howard, 2011). This lack of continuity 
has been illustrated by Baier (1980: 179), who showed that economic hardship in the early 
years of colonial rule, uncertainty in the cattle business, and inheritance law division of 
estates between heirs prevented the emergence of family dynasties in Eastern Niger.  
Several empirical studies also indicate that kin was frequently not the preferred means 
of doing business due to the social pressure that resulted from economic transactions between 
family members. Family ties offer comfort but the pressure from kin is capable of 
destabilizing prosperous businesses or preventing existing activities to flourish. As shown by 
Whitehouse (2012), traders have developed original ways to accumulate wealth when kin 
relations constituted a burden. One strategy is to join groups with different internal norms, 
such as reformist religious movements that promoted austerity and a reduction of social 
obligations. In Niger and Nigeria, for example, numerous large traders have joined the 
Society for the Removal of Innovation and Reinstatement of Tradition (known as Izala) in the 
last decades not only because the Islamist movement provided trust and reputation in the 
conduct of business operations but also because social obligations such as baptisms, 
marriages, and funerals were reduced among its members (Masquelier, 2009). Another 
strategy adopted by West African traders is to conceal their prosperity from their families by 
adopting a modest lifestyle. Such a strategy is however at odds with the fact that ostentatious 
display and symbolic investments help constitute a clientele and constitute a very important 
part of the definition of a successful trader in West Africa (Walther, 2008). The third strategy 
adopted by traders is to emigrate and establish trade diasporas far enough from their 
community of origin to escape from the daily pressure from kin, but close enough to play the 
role of cross-cultural brokers (Curtin, 1984). 
Since Cohen’s (1969 [2004]) study on the historical development and political 
implications of the Hausa trade diaspora of Ibadan, such communities have been thoroughly 
documented by numerous scholars, who highlighted that these spatially dispersed 
communities provided a suitable ground for reducing uncertainty and ensuring trust among 
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their members. Historical examples include Mande-Dyula traders in Côte d’Ivoire, Hausa 
traders in Dagomba and Ashanti kingdoms, Hausa, Gonja and Mossi traders in Northern 
Ghana, Kooroko traders in Bamako, Yarse traders in Kumasi, and Hausa traders in Abéché 
and N’Djamena (Meillassoux, 1971; Schildkrout, 1978; Works, 1976). More recent research 
has focused on Northern Nigerian in Ghana and on Malian in Brazzaville (Pellow, 2002; 
Whitehouse 2012). The creation of modern boundaries has provided impetus for these 
business communities that compete with nation states for control over resources and form the 
local roots of transnational networks. In many border regions, traders have developed their 
activities in markets that allow them to benefit from differentials between national-states, 
sometimes turning places with little previous history of commercial activities into regional 
commercial hubs, such as in Northern Benin, North-East Ghana, and in trinational area 
between Niger, Nigeria and Benin (Chalfin, 2001; Grätz, 2004; Walther, 2012). Facing the 
constraints and opportunity of crossing national borders on a daily basis, these traders have 
developed social networks that transcend the territorial organisation of states and their 
nationally-organized markets.  
 
Social networks 
 
In a business environment characterized by weak formal institutions, social networks provide 
the trust that neither the state nor formal business institutions can provide (Fafchamps, 2004). 
Traders typically conduct repeated business transactions with existing business partners, with 
whom they can exchange reliable information about prices, national regulations, border 
controls, and demand. Past collaborations exert a considerable influence in shaping the 
structure of current trade networks, as well as the pattern of future business transactions. In 
the absence of formal contracts, the gradual accumulation of trust between traders enhances 
productivity (Fafchamps and Minten, 1999; 2002). The more successful traders are often the 
better connected, because social networks tend to improve access to crucial information on 
prices, market conditions and loans, facilitate the regularity of trade flows and reduce the 
effects of uncertainties. Traders are constantly facing variations in the volume and direction of 
their business activities due to the seasonal and cyclical food shortages that affect West 
Africa. Depending on the season or on the availability of supplies, economic flows can 
abruptly decline or change directions, which make the establishment of a network of business 
partners strategically located on both sides of national borders indispensable. 
Social networks are also capable of responding to the instrumentalization of political 
disorder (Chabal and Daloz, 1999) orchestrated by national elites. The inability to predict 
which of the formal or informal rules will be applied by state representatives when dealing 
with trade agreements, blockade of key ports, or border conflicts, has led many traders to 
develop clientelist ties with state officials, or engage in local, regional or national politics 
themselves (Boone, 2006; Kraus 2002; Tangri 1999). Large traders engaged in transnational 
routes are even more concerned with minimizing the uncertainty of their business activities 
because crossing a border is equivalent to introducing an additional distance (Parsley and 
Wei, 2001) in an environment where transaction costs are already high. The capacity of social 
actors to pass through the border net (Nugent, 2008) depends very much on their social 
network, in particular the informal ties they maintain with state representatives, which ensure 
that crossing borders will not be too costly, lengthy and risky. 
Despite their crucial importance, social networks are frequently viewed as a metaphor 
for informal relations (Walther, 2014). Formal approaches examining the consequences of 
social relations for economic action in Africa are growing (see Conley and Udry 2010; 
Fafchamps, 2004; Fafchamps and Minten, 1999; 2002; Matous et al., 2013) but still constitute 
a marginal field of research compared with those who look at trade through markets and 
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prices, respectively seen as general principles of organisation, and as devices of coordination, 
of economic activities (see for example Aker and Mbiti, 2010; Aker et al., 2013; Ihle et al., 
2011; World Bank 2009). As mentioned by Spiro et al. (2013), a network approach is 
nonetheless particularly appropriate to understand trade, which is a fundamentally relational 
activity in which the constraints imposed on an individual and his outcomes are explained by 
the structure of the social network in which he is embedded (Brass and Krackhardt, 2012: 
355). It doesn’t mean, of course, that social actors are completely dependent on the structure 
in which they are embedded. Quite the opposite: every individual in a network can potentially 
have an influence on another actor and the network itself is nothing but the sum of the 
interactions between the actors. Network analysis argues that those approaches based solely 
on individual attributes, such as age, gender or race, are unable to take into consideration the 
fundamental fact that social actors are constrained by indirect relationships, not just 
relationships between ego and his alters, over which ego has little control (Burt, 1992). 
Recent research conducted in a variety of disciplinary and geographical contexts has 
shown that economic actors tend to reach a balance between two extreme structural positions 
that can potentially be detrimental to their business activities: a situation where they are the 
most central actor of a limited number of closely knitted peers, and a situation where they are 
structurally positioned as a broker between several clusters of actors with hardly any ties to 
their own group (Burt 2005; Fleming et al., 2007; Meagher 2010; Uzzi 1996). A strong degree 
of embeddedness can be beneficial to the activity of traders, since it provides trust between 
peers and reduces the risks associated with business activities. Strongly embedded actors are 
therefore regarded as very central, in the sense that they are surrounded by a large number of 
other actors with whom they frequently interact to exchange information, draw resources or 
communicate orders. This particular form of centrality, known as degree centrality because it 
refers to the number of ties of each actor or degree, however captures only a partial aspect of 
the centrality of social actors, which can also arise from the fact that they are able to reach 
other actors beyond their own group and play the role of brokers. 
Brokerage is widely regarded as the form of social relation that provides external 
resources and ideas. As shown by Spiro et al. (2013), brokerage is a fundamentally dynamic 
process, which can generate value in three different ways. Firstly, brokers can transfer 
resources between two disconnected parties, a situation known as tertius gaudens or 
“rejoicing third”. This structural position is routinely used by West African traders located in 
border regions, who act as a bridge between importers and final consumers along the 
transnational routes that link global markets to the interior of the continent. Secondly, brokers 
can facilitate matchmaking between two social actors to the benefit of each, a situation known 
as tertius iungens, or “the third who joins” (Obstfeld, 2005). In West Africa, traders are used 
to playing this role, by facilitating the creation of new ties between actors in several 
nationally-organized markets that would otherwise remain isolated. Finally, the added value 
of a broker can come from his ability to coordinate the business activities of third parties, a 
structural position that presents many advantages in those regions where transaction costs 
between business partners are high, such as between businessmen separated by huge distances 
and poor road infrastructure. 
 
CASE STUDY AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Two border regions 
 
Data was collected between January and December 2012 on five border markets located 
between Niger, Nigeria and Benin: Gaya-Malanville-Kamba (GaMaKa) and Birni N’Konni-
Illela (BNI) (Map 1).  
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Map 1. Location of case studies 
 
Cartography: author, adapted from OECD (2009) 
 
In the GaMaKa region, the development of long-distance trade activities has been 
considerably encouraged by the liberalisation of trade that occurred since the 1980s in West 
Africa. In this region – locally known as the Dendi – the native population is predominantly 
engaged in agriculture whereas the great majority of the traders are alien entrepreneurs 
attracted by the opportunities of cross-border trade. These Songhay, Zarma, Tuareg, Igbo, 
Fulani and Hausa traders have progressively transformed the small city of Gaya (estimated 
population of 44,000 in 2010) into a regional hub for re-export trade. Gaya is a particularly 
interesting location for wholesalers willing to trade with Nigeria, where the imports of 
numerous goods, such as second-hand clothes, are prohibited. A few kilometres south, the city 
of Malanville (60,000) is a regional centre for agricultural goods produced in the River Niger 
Valley, such as onion, cassava and cereals. A colonial creation, the market of Malanville is 
one of the largest in Benin and attracts a considerable crowd of foreign traders from 
neighbouring countries (Walther, 2009). The busy commercial activities of Gaya and 
Malanville contrast strongly with the relative decline of the neighbouring Nigerian city of 
Kamba (27,000), whose economic development has been slowed by the diminishing 
comparative price advantage of Nigerian products, poor road conditions and overall 
insecurity. Three hundred kilometres further north-east, the two border markets of Birni 
N’Konni (63,000) in Niger and Illela (32,000) in Nigeria also form a highly integrated border 
region. The two cities have a relatively long history of trade, which builds on the trade 
networks developed by the Hausa before colonial times. Today, Birni N’Konni and Illela 
constitute an important border post on the road between Sokoto and the northerner Hausaland 
in Niger as well as on the east-west N1 highway which cross the Republic of Niger. The 
region of Birni N’Konni is widely known in Niger for its onion production, which is exported 
to neighbouring countries. 
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A network approach 
 
Our study builds on the formal tools and theories developed by Social Network Analysis 
(SNA), a growing area of research that allows researchers to map the nodes and ties that 
compose a network, measure the importance of social actors and test research hypotheses (see 
Scott and Carrington, 2012). Instead of focusing on one key products or sector, we chose to 
focus on a set of products that are important for the economic development of the border 
regions. The identification of the relevant products was based on a preliminary macro-analysis 
of international trade conducted on the basis of longitudinal data from national customs 
authorities, pre-existing surveys made in the border regions in the mid-2000s, and an analysis 
of the goods banned in Nigeria, which are of high importance for re-export trade in West 
Africa (Raballand and Mjekiqi, 2010, see Walther et al. 2012 for a detailed analysis). 
This combination of data led us to identify four products whose trade would be highly 
important for the traders located in the two border region under consideration: building 
materials, cereals and flour, textile and used clothing. The trade of some of these products is 
sometimes considered illegal on one side of the border and legal on the other side; this is the 
case in particular for goods which are part of the re-export trade, such as textiles. As in 
previous studies (Igué and Soulé, 1993), we considered these trade flows as relevant for our 
survey, insofar as they did not generate criminal activities comparable to those of trafficking 
weapons, drugs or precious metals, but were the merely result of different legislation within 
the region. 
Once these products were identified, we identified the actors involved in trading them. 
Social network analysis differs from most of the surveys conducted in Africa in the sense that 
we are primarily interested in collecting data on the relations – rather than the attributes – of 
social actors. In contrast to traditional surveys that consider social actors as independent units 
that can be added until they constitute a representative sample of the population, our data are, 
by definition, relational and refer to non-independent observations (see Contractor et al., 
2006). Sampling a population would not work in our case because we don’t know how the 
social actors are intertwined with each other before we start our analysis and, by randomly 
selecting some of them, we would miss a large number of relevant connections. In order to 
address this issue, we used snow-balling techniques, a recognized alternative that allow 
identifying new economic agents from among the subjects’ existing acquaintances (Frank, 
2012).  Snowball sampling is a relational approach aiming at determining the boundaries of 
social networks. It differs from both the realist approach which presumes that the network is 
consciously experienced by the social actors, and of the nominalist approach, where the 
investigator imposes preconceived boundaries (Laumann et al., 1989: 68). It is particularly 
adapted to the study of cross-border traders, who don’t necessarily belong to a formal 
professional institution in which insiders could easily be distinguished from outsiders, and 
whose number and activities are extremely difficult to evaluate from the investigator’s 
perspective. 
With the help of local freight agents, we selected the traders whose annual turnover 
was over 100 FCFA million (€152,000) in 2010. This threshold is used by freight agents to 
distinguish between small traders whose activities are predominantly limited to petty business 
and large traders, locally known as patrons in French, who can potentially employ a greater 
number of employees and conduct much more ambitious trade activities. Focusing on large 
traders, we conducted a first wave of interviews with 43 of them during which they were 
asked to nominate whoever they consider as business partners, whatever their age, gender, 
ethnic group, nationality or religious membership. We collected data on the existence and 
frequency of business interaction between the actors as well as on the type of relationships 
between them (family, neighbour, organisation member, work, other friend). We concluded 
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that a tie existed if two actors had been in business in the last two years (2010-2012). These 
interviews produced a list of 114 nominees. We conducted two additional waves of interviews 
with the actors mentioned at least three times by the first wave. After three waves of 
interviews, the same names started appear again and again which meant that population 
saturation was reached. With a response rate of 87.9% in the GaMaKa trade network and 
88.9% in the BNI trade network, we work on an almost complete population and our results 
are not considered to be negatively affected by missing data (Kossinets, 2006). Contrarily to 
the Gulf of Guinea where some female traders have acquired prominent positions in the 
textile business (Golub, 2012), all the traders interviewed in this paper – except for one – are 
male. This can be explained by the selection of products operated in this study as well as by 
our decision to focus on large traders. A number of businesswomen are nonetheless active in 
both border regions, but most of them are small-scale retailers active in the sale of fruit, 
vegetables, fish, cassava, and traditional condiments, and maize (Author, 2008). 
The quantitative network analysis was complemented with an additional wave of 
interviews conducted with the aim to collect information on the nature of the ties between 
traders, which are crucial to explain their formation and their historical development. 
Understanding the nature of the ties also helps to explain differences in economic behaviour, 
since weak and strong ties do not always lead to the same outcomes: strong ties are influential 
in determining trust, providing access to non-codified information, advice, resolution of 
conflicts, while weak ties are best at searching out non redundant information and are less 
likely to imply reciprocity. Qualitative data on the nature of ties was collected through 
professional biographies. For each of the 38 large traders who agreed to be interviewed, we 
reconstructed the geographical itinerary that led him from his region of origin to one of the 
two border regions studied and documented the reasons that had motivated him to move from 
one location to another. 
 
THE STRUCTURE OF TRADE NETWORKS 
 
This section investigates the social structure of the networks found between Gaya-Malanville, 
and Kamba (GaMaKa) and Birni N’Konni-Illela (BI). Our aim is to identify the overall 
centralized or decentralized nature of the networks and the importance of central actors and 
brokers, before turning to the spatial structure of the networks and look for a border effect. 
 
Centralization: The social structure 
 
We test whether the trade networks are more hierarchical (or centralized) or more 
heterarchical (or decentralized). Centralized networks are composed of a small number of 
actors with many ties and tend to be more efficient in terms of coordination, because 
information, orders and resources can be more easily transferred from central nodes to the rest 
of the network. The star network in which a single actor occupies the centre of the network 
and where peripheral actors have no ties between each other is the most extreme example of a 
centralized network. Its opposite is the fully connected network, a completely decentralized 
structure where every node is connected to every other node. This structure, which can be 
found in ‘dark’ networks connecting terrorists or criminals, is far less efficient that the 
centralized one but much more resilient to threats because of its redundancy of ties. 
The structure of both trade networks is composed of relatively few decentralized 
actors (or nodes) with few business relations (or ties). As Table 1 shows, the BNI network is 
composed of 53 nodes and 64 ties, while the GaMaKa network is a little bit larger, with 83 
nodes and 104 ties, including two isolated dyads of actors. Both are sparse networks with a 
low level of clustering (0.094, 0.062) and a low density: only 4.6% and 3.1% of the potential 
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ties between the actors are actually present in the network. Most of the actors prefer 
maintaining relations with a limited number of contacts: the average number of business 
partners is 2.4 in both regions. The BNI network has a relatively short characteristic path 
length – every actor can be connected to every other by an average of 3.7 steps – while the 
GaMaKa network has a surprisingly long average path distance of 11.1, which theoretically 
designate a network where information does not spread easily. On the basis of these structural 
characteristics, the BNI network approximates a random network, with a low degree of 
clustering and short paths, while the GaMaKa has a more atypical structure. Its long average 
distance and low clustering differ both from a regular network composed of long paths and 
strong clusters, and from a random network. It is also the exact opposite of a small-world 
network, where most nodes can be reached from every other by a small number of steps even 
if they are not neighbours of one another (Watts and Strogatz, 1998). 
 
Table 1. Key metrics for the two networks 
 
Birni N’Konni-Illela 
(BNI) network 
Gaya-Malanville-Kamba 
(GaMaKa) network 
Number of nodes 53 83 
Number of links 64 104 
Number of dyadic isolates 0 2 
   
Density 0.046 0.031 
Average number of ties 2.385 2.357 
Clustering coefficient 0.094 0.062 
Average path length distance 3.712 11.092 
   
Average degree 0.046 0.026 
Average betweenness 0.053 0.036 
Average closeness 0.279 0.042 
   
Degree centralization 0.172 0.185 
Betweenness centralization 0.403 0.320 
Closeness centralization 0.268 0.020 
Calculations by the author using ORA (Carley, 2012). 
 
In addition to being loosely connected, the actors of both networks have relatively little 
centralization, as can be seen from their low average measures of centrality. The average 
degree measures whether nodes are linked to a particularly high number of actors, the average 
betweenness measures whether a node plays the role of a gatekeeper by controlling access to 
other nodes, and the average closeness refers to the minimum path distance between nodes. 
The decentralized nature of the networks is also confirmed by further centralization measures, 
which test whether the network contains potentially exceptional nodes whose centrality would 
strongly differ from the rest of the network. Table 1 presents three such measures: degree 
centralization, betweenness centralization, and closeness centralization. All measures vary 
from 0, a situation where no node is atypical in terms of centrality, to 1, a situation where the 
centrality of one node exceeds all nodes. Both networks have low values for degree 
centralization (0.172 in BNI and 0.185 in GaMaKa), which makes them less sensitive to 
fragmentation, since no node seems to be particularly highly connected. 
The relative absence of very central actors is evident on Figure 1, which maps 
business relations between traders as well as their importance in terms of degree centrality. 
The size of the nodes reflects the number of ties developed by each actor and the colour refers 
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to each of the border markets. The distance between the nodes is a social distance, meaning 
that the more distant the actors are on the sociogram and the fewer business relations they 
have. A part from El Hadj Harouna
1
, a Nigerian textile wholesaler from Kamba who entertain 
numerous business ties with relatively minor actors (in white at the bottom of the sociogram), 
most of the traders involved in the GaMaKa network express a low degree of centrality. 
The relatively higher measures found for betweenness centralization – 0.403 in BNI 
and 0.320 in GaMaKa – confirm however the existence of prominent brokers, which makes 
sense in a border setting where much profit can be expected from bridging different partners 
from various countries. Closeness centralization is higher in the BNI network (0.268) than in 
the GaMaKa network (0.020), which indicates that it contains more atypical actors that are 
closely connected at small distance than the other network (individual centrality measures for 
top scoring actors can be found in Appendix 1 and 2). 
 
Figure 1. Gaya-Malanville-Kamba trade network: degree centrality 
 
Source: author. Produced with *ORA (Carley, 2012). 
 
The major difference between the two trade networks comes from the fact that the proportion 
of ties exchanged within a group compared with the ties exchanged outside of the group – 
called homophily – is much larger in the GaMaKa network than in the BNI network. Despite 
the fact that local traders are located in the immediate vicinity of a national boundary, 86.6% 
of the ties exchanged within the GaMaKa network are with business partners from the same 
country, which is the sign of a highly homophilous network. Between Birni N’Konni and 
                                                 
1
 The names of the actors have been changed to protect confidentiality. The honorific terms El Hadj 
and Hadjia, reserved for Muslims who have successfully made the pilgrimage (Hajj) to Mecca, is 
commonly used in West Africa to characterize large traders. 
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Illela, on the contrary, Nigerien and Nigerian traders are not strictly segmented according to 
their country of residence: far more cross-border ties have developed and only 67.6% of the 
ties are within traders from the same country. This fundamental difference between the two 
networks is confirmed by the fact that the E/I index, calculated as the difference between 
external (E) and internal (I) ties for each country, divided by the total number of ties, is high 
and negative in the case of GaMaKa (-0.727**), indicating a preference for homophilous ties, 
whereas it is neutral in the BNI network (0.108), signalling that country membership is a not a 
relevant attribute for explaining the structure of the network. 
 
Brokerage roles according to countries 
 
Brokers can play different structural roles depending on whether they bridge actors from 
within or beyond their own group. The nature of the groups bridged by brokers can vary 
significantly: these may include formal groups, such as charity clubs, civic organisations or 
political parties, or informal groups, such as friendships, hobby groups, or neighbourhoods. In 
our case, we hypothesize that the existence of national borders creates several groups of 
traders according to their country of residence and test whether their brokerage roles vary 
according to their country membership. 
To do so, we draw on the typology developed by Gould and Fernandes (1989), which 
identified several types of brokerage roles based on their structural position: coordinator, 
itinerant (also known as consultant), gatekeeper, representative, and liaison brokers. In a triad 
composed of a broker (Ab) and two other nodes, coordinator brokers belong to the same group 
as the nodes they bridge (A--Ab--A). In our case, this would refer to traders coordinating 
economic activities within Niger, Nigeria or Benin respectively. For their part, itinerant 
brokers connect two nodes from a different group than their own (B--Ab--B), for example 
when a trader from Nigeria connects two Nigerien or two Beninese traders. These two 
categories of brokers are known as within group roles (Spiro et al., 2013), because the two 
alters A or B belong to the same group, contrarily to gatekeepers, representatives, and liaison 
brokers, who all connect individual between groups. In a non-directed network such as ours, 
gatekeepers and representatives have identical values and connect a source or a recipient to a 
different group (A--Ab--B or B--Ab--A). Liaison brokers connect two nodes from different 
countries (A--Ab--C). This latter brokerage role is only relevant if there are more than two 
countries, which is the case for the GaMaKa region between Niger, Benin and Nigeria. 
Table 2 summarizes the relative importance of each of the brokerage scores according 
to the country of residence of the actors. These are relative scores, which means that the raw 
scores obtained by counting the number of times each actor occupies a brokerage position 
within each network have been divided by expected values given group sizes. The results for 
the within group roles show that coordinator brokers bridging traders who belong to the same 
country are by far the most represented brokers in both networks and in all countries. 
Coordinators are particularly prominent in the GaMaKa network, which stresses the 
importance of national – rather than cross-border – business relations. Itinerant brokers 
bridging two actors from the same country are rare, except in the Nigerien part of the BNI 
network (0.87). As for the between group brokerage roles, our results indicate that 
gatekeepers/representatives are particularly represented in the Nigerian (1.00) and Nigerien 
(0.80) parts of the GaMaKa network. Liaison brokers, whose role of can only be analysed in a 
trinational setting, are surprisingly weakly represented in the GaMaKa region, where the 
conditions for bridging nodes that belong to different groups appeared theoretically to have 
been met. These results suggest that the most frequent brokers in the region bridge people 
from their own country. This has also another implication: that regional integration is 
maintained through relatively few cross-border ties. 
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Table 2. Relative brokerage scores by country and case study 
 
Coordinator 
(A--Ab--A) 
Itinerant 
(B--Ab--B) 
Gatekeeper/ 
Representative 
(A-- Ab--B, B--Ab--A) 
Liaison 
(A--Ab--C) 
BNI network 
  
  
Niger 2.04 0.87 0.58 - 
Nigeria 3.10 0.19 0.42 - 
Whole network 2.66 0.47 0.49 - 
GaMaKa network 
  
  
Niger 5.59 0.16 0.80 0.73 
Benin 7.12 0.38 0.35 0.04 
Nigeria 4.38 0.13 1.00 0.27 
Whole network 6.22 0.27 0.59 0.08 
Source: author’s calculation. Liaison brokers imply at least three groups (countries). 
 
The sociogram presented in Figure 2 provides a visual representation of the betweenness 
centrality scores in the BNI network. Each actor is represented according to his importance as 
a broker (size) and according to his country membership (colour). The business relations 
between traders are mediated through a limited number of prominent brokers, such as El Hadj 
Zainou, a Nigerien wholesaler of cereals born in Maradi, and El Hadj Talatu, a native of 
Sokoto active in the business of sugar and cooking oil. Without these actors, the network 
would break into several isolated components, some of them organized by nationality. 
 
Figure 2. Birni N’Konni-Illela trade network: betweenness centrality 
 
Source: author. Produced with *ORA (Carley, 2012). 
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Cross-border traders 
 
In order to better understand the importance of cross-border ties, we focus on the relatively 
few traders whose structural role is to connect different nationally-organized markets. In 
contrast to what may be initially assumed from a setting where markets are located at a very 
small distance from the border, not all traders are engaged in cross-border trade. As can be 
seen from Table 3, the proportion of cross-border business ties is significantly higher in the 
region of Birni N’Konni-Illela (31.3%) than in the region of Gaya-Malanville-Kamba (18.3%) 
as is the proportion of nodes with cross-border ties. There are a number of interesting 
differences within each region: the proportion of cross-border ties and nodes is always higher 
for actors located in Niger, as can be seen in the border markets of Gaya and Birni N’Konni, 
and the lowest proportion for traders located in Nigeria, as in Kamba and Illela. This element 
suggests macro dependence of Niger towards Nigeria as traders located in Niger are obliged 
to develop transnational business interactions.  
 
Table 3. Cross-border ties and nodes 
 BNI network GaMaKa network 
Cross-border ties 31.3% 18.3% 
Nodes with cross-border ties 43.4% 31.6% 
 - In Gaya (Niger) - 40.0% 
 - In Malanville (Benin) - 34.5% 
 - In Kamba (Nigeria) - 20.0% 
 - In Birni N’Konni (Niger) 56.0% - 
 - In Illela (Nigeria) 32.1% - 
Source: author’s calculation. 
 
Large traders have adopted several strategies to develop cross-border ties. A significant 
proportion of them have chosen to commute between different cities or to adopt a bi-
residential lifestyle. Among the traders for which we have detailed professional biographies, 
38.9% report having developed business and/or residence in several locations across national 
borders instead of relying exclusively on foreign partners. El Hadj Mohamed is a good 
example of this particular form of mobility which blends business and family. This large 
Songhay trader was born in 1940 in Niger moved to Ghana in the 1960s to learn the business 
of second-hand clothing. The 1969 Ghana Aliens Compliance order forced him to leave the 
country and he settled in the Beninese market of Malanville where his trade activity 
progressively diversified and where he currently employs a large workforce composed of 
family members, salaried truck drivers, and about 30 temporary Beninese workers. Like many 
of his peers, El Hadj Mohamed conducts most of his business in Malanville where his family 
resides but can frequently be seen across the border in Gaya (Interview, Malanville, April 23, 
2012). 
This spatial strategy reflects the evolution of long-distance trade in the region and the 
comparative advantages provided by both border markets. The generation of traders who 
arrived in the Dendi in the 1970s usually invested primordially in Benin, due to favourable 
custom regulation that allowed goods to be re-exported to neighbouring countries. The 
situation changed in the mid-1990s, during which it proved more profitable to import goods 
from the world market directly to the city of Gaya, which has since then become a regional 
hub for the re-exportation of second-hand clothes to Nigeria. As a consequence, many 
experienced traders that had initially chosen to settle in Malanville have subsequently built 
large warehouses in Niger and continue to commute frequently between the two markets. The 
case of El Hadj Moussa, a Nigerien trader born in 1950, who also spend several years in 
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Ghana before moving to Malanville, is representative of this evolution. He has invested in 
several warehouses in Gaya and constructed a house in Malanville. While living in Malanville 
with his family he crosses the border on a daily basis to conduct his business on the other side 
of the Niger River (Interview, Malanville, November 21, 2012). 
The wives of polygamous traders frequently reside in the major market cities. This is 
the case of El Hadj Hamidou, for example. This Hausa trader born in 1967 in Nigeria, 
successively married with a women in Kamba and in Sokoto. His personal choice is to keep 
conducting business in both locations because this allows him to benefit from short-term or 
seasonal opportunities (Interview, Kamba, November 16, 2012). Multiple residences provide 
numerous advantages from an economic perspective by allowing traders to be firmly 
embedded in several local societies simultaneously, helping the employability of their 
children in the local business, and providing access to valuable real estate or agricultural 
lands. In both regions, large traders are known for investing a significant portion of their 
profits in purchasing land available for urban development, building shops and warehouses, 
and renting large one-story property, locally known as villas. El Hadj Zakari, a Hausa native 
of Birni N’Konni, illustrate this investment strategy: born in 1960 and currently one of the 
wealthiest traders of the market, he has built around ten villas in his home town, which are 
used to house his family of 40 members, rented to local civil servants or temporarily loaned to 
his business associates (Interview, Birni N’Konni, March 16, 2012). 
In a volatile environment such as the two border regions studies, wealthy traders are 
known for diversifying their investment strategies and have been reported purchasing 
agricultural lands either for developing irrigated crops or for rain-based agriculture 
(Cantoreggi et al., 2014). A good example is provided by El Hadj Bako, a Nigerian trader 
born in 1965, who has invested heavily in real estate in his home town of Illela where he owns 
several blocks along Main Street, who has built several shops and a parking lot in the 
neighbouring city of Birni N’Konni, and purchased numerous agricultural plots in Nigeria 
exploited by salaried employees (Interview, Illela, November 10, 2012). 
The differences between the two networks become even clearer when the social 
networks are geolocalized. As shown in Figure 3, the BNI network is structured around 
numerous cross-border links. Most of the large traders from the region are used to travelling 
across the national border to do business with their foreign correspondents and none of them 
occupies a strong brokerage position between countries. By contrast, the GaMaKa network is 
structured around few cross-border ties that provide opportunity for a limited number of 
brokers. We argue that the differences in the form of these two business communities can be 
explained by their historical development since pre-colonial times. 
The border area of Birni N’Konni-Illela is characterized by the highly informal nature 
of economic activities between Niger and Nigeria and the historical ethnic networks that have 
developed between them. A large majority of the traders come from the cities where they do 
business and are of Hausa origin. The continuity of trade observed in the BNI region does not 
seem to characterize the border region between Gaya, Malanville and Kamba. In this region, 
migration-and-settlement narratives collected locally emphasize the opposition between 
Songhay conquerors from the declining Empire of Gao, who took political power, and 
Kyanga chiefs of Hausa origin, who retained religious power over traditional cults (Walther, 
2012). Trade activities are nowhere mentioned in the oral accounts of the encounter between 
these two populations, which could erroneously lead to conclude that the region has no prior 
history of trade. The Dendi region was however historically located on one of the main trade 
routes developed between Hausaland and Asante in the 19
th
 century. Caravans of Hausa 
traders from Kano, Sokoto and Jega stopped in Gaya before crossing the Niger River on their 
way to Sansanne Mango, Yendi-Gamaji and Salaga, their final destination, where kola nuts 
were purchased (Lovejoy, 1980). 
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Figure 3. Social network in the two border regions 
 
Source and cartography: author. 
 
The region was more than just a milestone on the busy commercial routes of the Hausa: it was 
also a production centre of salt, extracted in the fossil valleys of the Niger River, and exported 
regionally by Dendi merchants (Lovejoy, 1986). These merchants widely spread their trade 
networks from that region and exerted a considerable influence in northern Benin and Togo 
since the 18
th
 century (Curtin, 1984: 17). By the 19
th
 century, the business activity of the 
Dendi was so intense that their language – which derives from Songhay – had become the 
dominant trade language of the northern regions of present day Togo and Benin. Today, the 
Dendi population of Gaya, Malanville and Kamba is predominantly engaged in agricultural 
activities and up to 80% of the large traders surveyed in this paper do not come from the city 
in which they work. Similar percentages were found in studies focusing on small-scale traders 
in the region (Walther, 2012), which is consistent with previous findings from north-eastern 
Ghana and north Benin, which indicate that foreign traders are usually in the majority in 
border markets and act as trailblazers for commercial diasporas (Grätz, 2004). 
The discrepancy between the historical activities of the Dendi and their current 
professional occupations raises two interesting questions for further research. Firstly, it is 
unclear why trade is currently dominated by traders from outside of the region if the Dendi 
used to have a pre-colonial history of long-distance trade. In the absence of clear empirical 
evidence, it can only be hypothesized that trade in the Dendi suffered from major disruptions 
in the 19
th
 century, perhaps due to the Fulani jihad of 1804-1808, which is known for having 
temporarily dislocated trade and destroyed the business of many traders in Hausaland and in 
the neighbouring regions (Lovejoy, 1980: 52). 
It could also have been caused by the reorganisation of trade networks, from the 
interior of West Africa to the Gulf of Guinea, which would have made the commercial route 
passing through Gaya obsolete. Secondly, it is not known why Gaya wasn’t a larger trade 
centre at the beginning of the 20
th
 century if the city was situated along one of the main 
caravan routes between Hausaland and the Asante forest. Colonial records indicate that Gaya 
was little more than a small village with no significant market infrastructure when the French 
arrive in the region at the turn of the last century (Perron, 1924) and its population only 
reached 3,700 in 1960. Again, too little is known about the historical evolution of the city to 
judge whether its small size was due to the fact that it was only a transit town, where very few 
traders were actually established, or if it is because the Dendi spread from the Gaya region to 
southern Benin that Gaya itself did not become a major centre of commerce. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
So far, studies devoted to cross-border trade have rarely – if ever – used formal approaches to 
represent and analyse social networks in West Africa, relying instead on econometric methods 
that consider the price of commodities as a proxy for evaluating regional integration or on 
qualitative approaches that aim at understanding the professional history of traders as well as 
their sociability. This paper argues that the models describing the organisational structure of 
social networks developed by social network analysis over the last decades also apply to West 
African trade networks. 
Our first contribution is to study how trade networks vary in terms of centralization. 
We find that both networks are rather decentralized, with few business relations between the 
actors. Whereas the network between Birni N’Konni and Illela (BNI) approximates a random, 
with a low level of clustering and short paths, the network between Gaya, Malanville and 
Kamba (GaMaKa) has an atypical structure, characterized by a huge number of steps between 
the traders. Looking at the trade-off between embeddedness and brokerage, the former 
referring to the inclusion of social actors within their group, and the latter referring to the ties 
that actors build beyond their group, the paper shows that border trade relies on the presence 
of a small number of prominent brokers who are able to connect different markets. 
Despite the proximity to national borders, we find that the GaMaKa network is mainly 
built around ties between partners from the same country, which is a clear indication of a 
homophilous network. The BNI network is again rather difference in that it contains a larger 
number of actors with cross-border ties. The difference in the spatiality of the two networks 
reflects the historical development of both regions. Between Birni N’Konni and Illela, in the 
heart of Hausaland, historical ethnic networks have probably constantly evolved since 
precolonial times. In contrast, the development of the trade activities between Gaya, 
Malanville and Kamba is much more recent and primordially linked to the liberalisation of 
international trade in the 1980s. These results show decisively that social relationships in 
trade can vary dramatically in terms of structure, which speak to the importance of using 
social approaches as a substitute for or complement to other methods of understanding cross-
border trade. 
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Appendix 1. GaMaKa network: Top scoring nodes for selected centrality measures 
Rank 
Agent Degree Agent Closeness Agent 
Betweennes
s 
1 Harouna 0.207 Aziz 0.052 Harouna 0.352 
2 Hassane 0.110 Ibrahim 0.052 Aziz 0.278 
3 Waziri 0.093 Mounkaila 0.051 Hassane 0.261 
4 Aziz 0.077 Hassane 0.051 Mounkaila 0.251 
5 Issa Yaye 0.077 Aminou 0.050 Ibrahim 0.221 
6 Ibrahim 0.073 Harouna 0.050 Aminou 0.206 
7 Mounkaila 0.073 Nasser 0.049 Moumouni 0.152 
8 
Moustapha 
0.073 
Moustaph
a 
0.049 
Abdelnasse
r 
0.145 
9 Moumouni 0.061 Abdou 0.049 Mohamed 0.137 
10 Adams 0.061 Mohamed 0.048 Jawad 0.133 
Mean 
 
0.026 
 
0.042 
 
0.036 
Std. Dev 
 
0.030 
 
0.009 
 
0.074 
Source: Calculations by the author using ORA (Carley, 2012). 
 
 
Appendix 2. BNI network: Top scoring nodes for selected centrality measures 
Rank Agent Degree Agent Closeness Agent Betweenness 
1 Nafisa 0.212 Talatu 0.409 Zainou 0.449 
2 Yabuku 0.192 Yabuku 0.394 Talatu 0.397 
3 Zainou 0.173 Yacine 0.385 Yabuku 0.370 
4 Yacine 0.154 Zainou 0.385 Nafisa 0.314 
5 Talatu 0.154 Nafisa 0.385 Yacine 0.268 
6 Mourad 0.135 Jaffer 0.351 Khaleed 0.238 
7 Bako 0.115 Mounir 0.327 Mourad 0.219 
8 Sani 0.096 Raki 0.319 Sani 0.115 
9 Murna 0.077 Babangida 0.319 Raki 0.113 
10 Raki 0.077 Murna 0.313 Bako 0.091 
Mean  0.046  0.279  0.053 
Std. 
Dev 
 0.049  0.052  0.112 
Source: Calculations by the author using ORA (Carley, 2012). 


